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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2020, the City of Houston (the City) did the unthinkable.
The City canceled the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo for the first time
since its inception in 1932.1
For those unaware, “the Rodeo,” as it is referred to in Houston, is a big
deal. Somewhere along the party spectrum between Mardi Gras and a calffry, the Rodeo is an annual non-profit event put on by a mix of volunteers2
and paid staff to “promote[] agriculture,” “educate[] and entertain[] the
public,” “showcase[] Western heritage, and provide[] year-round
educational support within the community.”3 Not your average venue for
bulldogging and bronc ridin’, the Rodeo is “the world’s largest entertainment
and livestock exhibition,” featuring competitors from all over the globe, and
it is the City’s “signature event” of the year.4 In 2019, for instance, the
Rodeo attracted over 2.5 million attendees,5 had more than a quarter-billion
dollar economic impact on the greater Houston area, and supported over
5,000 jobs.6 Its regular contributions to Houston’s rich socio-cultural
landscape are also noteworthy as, each year, the Rodeo awards over 800
college scholarships to student art and livestock exhibitors,7 and it hosts one
1. See Mike Morris, Jasper Scherer & Dylan McGuinness, Houston Rodeo Canceled Over Coronavirus
Concerns, Prompted by Montgomery County Case, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2020, 10:55 AM),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/houston-rodeo-shutdown-coronavirus-concerns-15123010.php [https://perma.cc/LZ7M-6ARF] (reporting on the
cancellation of the Rodeo in light of growing concerns about community spread).
2. One of the distinctive features of the Rodeo is its large, devoted volunteer workforce. See
Alexis Grant, Cost of Rodeo Volunteering Big but Perks Follow, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2008, 5:30 AM),
https://www.chron.com/life/rodeo/article/Cost-of-rodeo-volunteering-big-but-perks-follow-15986
91.php [https://perma.cc/J8YS-CYMH] (introducing the Rodeo’s volunteer corps).
3. Mission Statement, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.rodeo
houston.com/About-Us/Who-We-Are [https://perma.cc/E986-CTT9].
4. It’s the World’s Largest Event of Its Kind: The Annual Houston Livestock and Rodeo, TOUR TEX.
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.tourtexas.com/articles/32/it%27s-the-world%27s-largest-event-of-itskind:-the-annual-houston-livestock-and-rodeo [https://perma.cc/9RMG-VZ6G].
5. See Attendance, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.rodeohouston.com/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Attendance [https://perma.cc/7HDDZXDA] (denoting all grounds activities at the 2019 Rodeo totaled 2,506,263 attendees).
6. See 2019 Economic Impact, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO (June 25, 2019),
https://www.rodeohouston.com/News/Article/ArtMID/494/ArticleID/2544/2019-Economic-Im
pact [https://perma.cc/5HDK-D3KR] (“The 2019 Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo generated a
total economic impact of $227 million and total economic activity of $391 million in Greater
Houston . . . .”).
7. See Commitment, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.
rodeohouston.com/Educational-Support/Commitment#Scholarships [https://perma.cc/KLY6-3J
KQ] (stating the Rodeo is “one of the largest scholarship providers in the [United States]”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/4

2

Longoria: The Case for the Rodeo

2020]

THE CASE FOR THE RODEO

127

of the more star-studded music festivals in the area. Since its inception, for
example, the Rodeo has hosted the likes of Elvis Presley, Bob Dylan,
Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, and Willie Nelson.8
So, when Sylvester Turner, the Mayor of Houston (the Mayor), ordered
the Rodeo to close its gates due to growing concerns over the coronavirus
pandemic, more than a few feathers were ruffled. Rodeo goers were madder
than a wet hen,9 local news stations rushed to the closing Rodeo grounds to
capture the teary-eyed reactions of student exhibitioners,10 and at least one
City Council member published his strong opposition to the Mayor’s
decision.11
But perhaps more importantly, many lost their jobs. Forced to close, the
Rodeo could no longer afford much of the unskilled paid labor used to staff
its events.12 The cancellation forced many of the vendors who depend on
the Rodeo for their livelihood into a precarious position.13 Not only were
8. See Past Entertainers, HOUS. LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.
rodeohouston.com/About-Us/History/Past-Entertainers [https://perma.cc/PWJ6-PTU5] (listing
various artists who have performed at the Rodeo).
9. See Brooke A. Lewis, ‘What Are You Talking About?’ Visitors React with Disbelief to Houston Rodeo
Cancellation, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2020, 10:56 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.
com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/What-are-you-talking-about-Visitors-react-15123867.php
[https://perma.cc/9S3W-W982] (providing testimony from many individuals who were disappointed
about the cancellation); see also Erica Ponder, Social Media Erupts After Rodeo is Canceled amid Coronavirus
Concerns, CLICK2HOUSTON (Mar. 11, 2020, 1:05 PM), https://www.click2houston.com/rodeo/2020/
03/11/social-media-erupts-after-rodeo-is-canceled-amid-growing-coronavirus-concerns/ [https://
perma.cc/4QZ2-7T4Q] (“People get the flu daily, but we cancel this event because 25 people have this
in our state . . . wow! Overreact much? I feel bad for the kids, rodeo participants and volunteers that
have worked so hard to either participate or volunteer for the rodeo. Lot[s] of money and time
wasted.”).
10. See KTRK Houston, Rodeo Goer’s Emotional Reaction to Cancellation, YAHOO! (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://news.yahoo.com/rodeo-goers-emotional-reaction-cancellation-191054640.html [https://per
ma.cc/K3RU-Z6Y9] (showing one Rodeo exhibitioner’s emotional response to the closure).
11. See Greg Travis, Houston City Council Member District G, Press Release (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Council-Member-Travis-Objects-to-Rodeo-Cancellation.html
?soid=1102998498508&aid=a9UGyizx95Q) [https://perma.cc/TU9C-MWYF] (showing the reaction
of Greg Travis, a member of Houston’s city council, who released a public statement rebuking the
Mayor for turning Houston in to a “nanny state,” which prevented its “residents . . . [from]
determin[ing] for themselves whether or not [participating in] public activity [wa]s a worthwhile
gamble”).
12. See Peter Holley, Houston Rodeo Calls It Quits Over Coronavirus Concerns, TEX. MONTHLY
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/houston-rodeo-calls-it-quits-over-coro
navirus-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/9MYW-3NXJ] (journaling the economic impact of the Rodeo
on Houston).
13. See Houston Rodeo Vendors Scramble After Cancellation, KHOU 11 (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:04 PM),
https://www.khou.com/video/news/health/coronavirus/houston-rodeo-vendors-scramble-after-
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the vendors deprived of an opportunity to sell their goods at the Rodeo, in
several cases they had encumbered themselves with large loans to pre-order
the inventory they planned to sell.14 But what was the City’s alternative?
Houston’s Mayor appeared to be responding to a credible threat. At least
four individuals confirmed to have contracted the coronavirus attended the
Rodeo,15 and the virus’s proliferation rate was well documented.16 In all
fairness, the Rodeo needed to be closed to help “flatten the curve.”17
But our forefathers long ago envisioned that this horse trade might
happen. That at some point, an unlucky few would need to sacrifice their
property rights for the benefit of all. And their solution was clear: if the
government finds itself in the uncomfortable situation of needing to take
“private property” for a “public use,” it has a duty to provide those unlucky
landowners with “just compensation” for the property taken.18 In doing
so, the Government “prevents the public from loading upon one individual
more than his just share of the burdens of government . . . .”19 Giving “just
compensation” in exchange for private property taken for public use
ensures “‘the security of Property,’ which Alexander Hamilton described to
the Philadelphia Convention as one of the ‘great ob[jects] of

cancellation/285-628a502c-7c3f-4d31-af88-696fe5ff169d [https://perma.cc/3Q7V-2468] (reporting
on vendors’ expected losses due to the cancellation).
14. See id. (“One longtime vendor that we spoke with said that [they] expect[] to lose $100,000
and maybe more this year.”).
15. Emily Foxhall, Four Coronavirus Cases Connected to Houston Rodeo Cookoff Tent, Organizer Says,
HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 16, 2020, 9:12 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Four-coronavirus-cases-connected-to-Houston-rodeo-15136030.php [https://
perma.cc/M9XY-LW49].
16. See Harry Stevens, Why Outbreaks Like Coronavirus Spread Exponentially, and How to “Flatten the
Curve”, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/
corona-simulator/ [https://perma.cc/6VEU-ND35] (providing a hypothetical disease in hypothetical
towns to illustrate the high contagiousness of Coronavirus).
17. See Denise Chow & Jason Abbruzzese, What is ‘Flatten the Curve’? The Chart that Shows How
Critical It Is for Everyone to Fight Coronavirus Spread, NBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020, 1:15 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/what-flatten-curve-chart-shows-how-critical-it-ev
eryone-fight-n1155636 [https://perma.cc/B97A-AK5Y] (“The catchy phrase refers to a so-called
epidemic curve that is commonly used to visualize responses to disease outbreaks—and illustrates why
public and individual efforts to contain the spread of the virus are crucial.”).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a) (“No person’s property shall be taken,
damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made . . . .”).
19. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
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Gov[ernment].’”20 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it guarantees
“stable property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive,
unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s eminent domain power—
particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, may be unable
to protect themselves in the political process against the majority’s will.”21
For these reasons, this Article argues Houston’s Mayor effectuated a
compensable taking under both the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983,22 and Article 1, Section 17
of the Texas Constitution, when he forced the Rodeo to close its gates.
Now, to those unfamiliar with federal and Texas jurisprudence
surrounding the issue of eminent domain, this may seem like a no-brainer.
Of course, Houston’s municipal government should provide compensation
for the property rights it took when it forced the Rodeo’s closure because—
but for the Mayor’s actions—the Rodeo would have operated happily!
Though a lack of forced closure may have meant reduced attendance and
revenue in light of concerns about the coronavirus, such are the risks of
property ownership.23 However, the law surrounding takings is not so
simple. “[N]o magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether
a given government interference with property is a taking,”24 and when
courts attempt to invent one, it often leads to unjust results.25 Instead,
courts are required to perform a case-by-case inquiry to determine if a taking
has been effectuated, which focuses on the duration, manner, and effect of

20. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(alterations in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
21. Id.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, . . .”).
23. See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 490 (Tex. 2012) (“The actions
of the State do not constitute a taking simply because [a party] cannot earn as much money on its
investment as it originally hoped.”); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (“Prediction of
profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to
perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has
traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests.”).
24. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012).
25. See id. at 38 (overturning the appellate court’s holding that “government-induced flooding
temporary in duration” is “automatic[ally] exempt[ed] from Takings Clause inspection”).
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the government’s action.26 But this requirement has not existed for long.
Indeed, until 1980, many Texas courts categorically prohibited takings
claims against the government where the government acted pursuant to its
police powers.27 Pre-1980 Texas courts instead opted to steer clear of the
“sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog” altogether.28
In a weird way, this makes sense. Courts have long held that “attempting
to decide when a regulation becomes a taking [is] among the most litigated
and perplexing [issues] in current law.”29 And, perhaps ironically, few
courts want to be in the position of deciding winners and losers. So it is
understandable that a court would seize the opportunity to avoid takings
inquiries altogether, instead, opting for bright-line rules on the matter.
However, as Texas and federal courts have learned, takings questions are
unavoidable and varied.30 So where then should courts draw the line?
When does government action or regulation “go so far in imposing public
burdens on private interests as to require compensation[?]”31 The
government cannot rightly be expected “to pay out of [its] own pocket for
the general salvation” every time it acts as “[t]he champion of the public.”32
Yet, justice and fairness suggest there is a “moral obligation upon the group”

26. See id. at 32–34 (stating, aside from a narrow set of exceptions, “most takings claims turn on
situation-specific factual inquiries”).
27. See Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1980) (“Recent decisions by this
court have broadly applied the underlying rationale to takings by refusing to differentiate between an
exercise of police power, which excused compensation, and eminent domain, which required
compensation. That dichotomy, we have held, has not proved helpful in determining when private
citizens affected by governmental actions must be compensated.”).
28. Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004) (citing
City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex.1978) and Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham,
354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (1962)) (adopting the term “sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog” to describe the
“legal battlefield” of cases deciding when regulations become takings).
29. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgement and
dissenting in part) (“The question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.” (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978))).
30. See Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 (listing an interesting set of inverse-condemnation cases: “Thus
one who dynamites a house to stop the spread of a conflagration that threatens a town, or shoots a
mad dog in the street, or burns clothing infected with smallpox germs, or, in time of war, destroys
property which should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy, is not liable to the owner,
so long as the emergency is great enough, and he has acted reasonably under the circumstances”).
31. Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2006).
32. Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 792 (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (4th ed.,
1971)).
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benefitting from the Government’s actions “to make compensation in such
a case.”33
This Article will explore questions like these at the frontier of eminent
domain law—using the Rodeo’s closure as its case study. In doing so, it will
attempt to clear the muddied waters of the Court’s jurisprudence on
compensable takings. Because of the Rodeo’s location, and because of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Knick v. Township of Scott,34 this analysis
will be done using both federal and Texas law. However, since many state
jurisdictions either parallel federal takings law, or have made their respective
takings statutes more stringent—finding compensable takings more easily
than Texas or the federal government—this analysis will apply to many
other state jurisdictions as well.35 Ultimately, the caselaw used does not
affect this Article’s conclusion. The City took the Rodeo’s property when
it forced the Rodeo’s closure on March 11, 2020, regardless of the fact that
it acted pursuant to its police powers.36 Further, this Article will show,
when properly read,37 existing state and federal case law supports such a
finding in favor of the Rodeo’s regulatory takings case against the City.
By closing the Rodeo’s gates, the City “singled out” the Rodeo “to bear
all of the cost[s]” of the City’s public health initiative “for the community
benefit without distributing any [of these costs] among the members of the
community.”38 This decision had severe and lasting consequences. Jobs
33. Id.
34. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019) (“Contrary to Williamson County, a
property owner has a claim for a violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his
property for public use without paying for it.”); cf. Williamson Cnty Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) (“[A] claim that the application of government
regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations
to the property at issue.”), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2162.
35. See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. 2012) (“We consider
the federal and state takings claims together, as the analysis for both is complementary.”); see also Est.
& Heirs of Sanchez v. Cnty. of Bernalillo, 902 P.2d 550, 552 (N.M. 1995) (holding the same for New
Mexico); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 651 (Okla. 2006) (holding Oklahoma’s takings
laws are more stringent than the federal law like “Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, South Carolina,
Michigan, and Maine”). Therefore, the reasoning in this Article will apply to these jurisdictions as well,
because these courts are more likely than Texas and federal courts to find that a compensable taking
has occurred.
36. Admittedly, this does make the question a closer call.
37. As this Article will explain in detail, the case law surrounding regulatory takings is both large
and unclear. Part of the goal of this Article is to show that current regulatory takings case law supports
a regulatory-takings claim like the Rodeo’s.
38. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. 1978).
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were lost,39 children’s scholarship funds were withheld,40 and countless
individuals were pushed into debt.41 It makes no difference that the City
acted pursuant to its police powers. The City’s forced closure of the Rodeo
went “too far”42 in regulating the Rodeo’s property, and by doing so, it
directly and intentionally interfered with the Rodeo’s reasonable “economic
expectations.”43 This is not a burden the Rodeo should have to shoulder
alone.
What is truly more frightening? That the government may be required to
compensate property owners every time it intentionally shutters a duly
licensed business, or “dynamites a house to stop the spread of a
conflagration that threatens a town, or shoots a mad dog in the street, or
burns clothing infected with smallpox germs, or, in time of war, destroys
property which should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the
enemy”44—or that all this could be done with an unlucky few paying the
bill for all? Why should eminent domain law value the public fisc over
justice and fairness? And why can takings jurisprudence not live up to the
expectations America’s forefather placed on it? These are all questions this
Article will attempt to answer in making the case for the Rodeo.
II. THE CITY’S TAKING
Unlike a typical condemnation case where a governmental entity is the
plaintiff suing to take possession of privately-owned land, the Rodeo’s
property was never formally condemned by the City. Accordingly, the
Rodeo would be required to initiate inverse condemnation proceedings to
receive “just compensation for [the] taking of [its] property.”45 Sometimes
39. See Past Entertainers, supra note 8 (listing the entertainers who lost their contracts to perform
at the Rodeo).
40. Amber Elliot, With Rodeo Cancelled, What Happens to Kids Gunning for Scholarships?,
HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/life/article/With-rodeocanceled-what-happens-to-kids-gunning-15126675.php [https://perma.cc/AX2F-CDU8].
41. See KTRK Houston, supra note 10 (showing a video interview of an individual expressing
concerns about going into debt).
42. Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. 2006).
43. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(identifying several factors, such as economic impact, the government must consider when imposing
regulations).
44. Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Tex. 1980).
45. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) (“Inverse condemnation should be
distinguished from eminent domain. Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a
government asserts its authority to condemn property. Inverse condemnation is ‘a shorthand
description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property
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also referred to as a “regulatory taking”46 when there has been no claim of
physical invasion by the governmental entity, the success of an inverse
condemnation claim is deeply tied to the duration, manner, and effect of the
government act, which is the basis of the inverse condemnation claim.47
Therefore, the case for the Rodeo must begin with understanding how,
specifically, the City took the Rodeo’s property.
Since 2001, the Rodeo has leased space in Houston’s NRG Park Complex
from the Harris County Sports & Convention Corporation,48 which is the
subdivision of the Harris County government charged with “managing,
operating, maintaining and developing the sports and entertainment
complex located on County-owned property, known as NRG Park.”49 This
lease, although a governmental entity granted it, endows the Rodeo with
formal property rights to use and enjoy NRG Park,50 including the
“exclusive” right to “hold, occupy, use, and enjoy” the NRG facilities for
when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.’” (citation omitted) (quoting United States
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980))); see also Inverse Condemnation, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY
(3d ed. 2010) (showing inverse condemnation is defined as “[t]he taking of property by an actual
interference with or disturbance of property rights, without an actual entry upon the property”).
46. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 739 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(explaining a regulatory taking is a type of inverse condemnation); see also City of Houston v. Commons
at Lake Hous., Ltd., 587 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], no pet.) (explaining a
regulatory taking is a type of inverse condemnation, which does not involve physical invasion).
47. See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 477–78 (Tex. 2012)
(“Notwithstanding the fact specific nature of takings cases, the Supreme Court has established a general
framework against which courts apply the individualized facts of alleged regulatory takings. Penn
Central, Sheffield, and Mayhew govern regulatory takings challenges and they set out three guiding factors.
First is the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. The second factor under Penn Central
is the character of the governmental action. The third consideration is the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with the economic expectations of the property owner.” (citations omitted)
(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127; Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights,
140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998))).
48. Lease Agreement Between Harris Cnty. Sports & Convention Corp., Landlord, and
Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc., Tenant (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter The Lease]
https://www.houstonsports.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/HLSR_Stadium_Lease_Agreement.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ5Z-G8VV] (containing a full copy of the lease agreement between the
Rodeo and the Harris County Sports & Convention Corporation).
49. For those interested in sports, this is the same facility the Houston Texans use to host their
games and the site of the Astrodome. See Harris County Sports & Convention Corporation, NRG PARK,
https://www.nrgpark.com/hcscc/ [https://perma.cc/S29S-D43E] (providing a general description of
the Harris County Sports & Convention Corporation).
50. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 707
(2010) (emphasizing the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “state law defines property interests”);
see also Elliott v. Joseph, 351 S.W.2d 879, 882–84 (Tex. 1961) (acknowledging a leasehold is a property
interest for which a lessee can be compensated).
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the term of the lease.51 Like any of the other sticks in a private property
owners’ bundle, the Rodeo’s leasehold is a compensable property interest a
government entity can take.52
Usually beginning around the first week of March and continuing for the
next twenty days thereafter, the Rodeo opened its gates to the public on
March 3, 2020, as scheduled. Perhaps surprisingly, concerns over the
coronavirus did not hamper the Rodeo’s success in the days it was allowed
to operate. Paid attendance was either higher than or similar to attendance
the previous year,53 several new attractions were unveiled,54 and the
Rodeo’s barbecue cook-off competition went off without a hitch.55
However, amid mounting pressure from local residents to close after South
by Southwest’s cancellation56 and the World Health Organization’s
declaration of “global pandemic,”57 Mayor Turner issued the following
“Proclamation Declaring a Local State of Disaster Due to a Public Health
Emergency” on March 11, 2020:
WHEREAS, in December 2019, a respiratory disease caused by a novel
coronavirus was detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. The virus
has been named “SARS-CoV-2” and the disease it causes has been named
“coronavirus disease 2019” (COVID-19). Symptoms of COVID-19 include

51. The Lease, supra note 48, at 4.
52. See Motiva Enters., LLC v. McCrabb, 248 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, pet. denied) (“A lessee is entitled, as a matter of law, to share in a condemnation award when
part of its leasehold interest is lost by condemnation.”).
53. See Attendance, supra note 5 (providing figures on attendance to the Rodeo).
54. Craig D. Lindsey, Rodeo Houston Unveils Exciting and Extreme New Attractions for 2020,
CULTURE MAP HOUS. (Feb. 20, 2020, 10:23 AM), https://houston.culturemap.com/news/
entertainment/02-20-20-rodeohouston-social-spur-extreme-dogs-show-agvenutre-park-barbecue-coo
k-off/ [https://perma.cc/7DEQ-NV7G].
55. See Doogie Roux, The 2020 Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo Cook-off, HOUS. PRESS (Feb. 28,
2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/slideshow/the-2020-rodeo-cook-off-11451824/2
[https://perma.cc/7TS9-RNPT] (showing a slideshow of the Rodeo Cook-Off’s success); see also
Attendance, supra note 5 (showing attendance to the Rodeo’s barbecue competition also increased from
2019).
56. Tierra Smith, Thousands Sign Petition to Cancel the Houston Rodeo amid Growing Coronavirus
Concerns, CLICK2HOUSTON (Mar. 8, 2020, 2:33 PM), https://www.click2houston.com/rodeo/2020/
03/07/heres-why-organizers-say-there-are-no-plans-to-wrap-up-rodeohouston-early-amid-slew-of-hi
gh-profile-event-cancellations/ [https://perma.cc/5TFN-VATM] (describing South by Southwest as
a film, interactive media, and music festival that takes place every year in Austin, Texas).
57. Garrett M. Graff, An Oral History of the Day Everything Changed, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2020, 6:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/an-oral-history-of-the-day-everything-changed-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/B3TA-F328].
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fever, cough, and shortness of breath. Outcomes have ranged from mild to
severe illness, and in some cases death; and
...
WHEREAS, I, the Mayor of the City of Houston have determined that
emergency measures must be taken to either prepare for or respond to a
disaster due to this public health emergency in order [to] respond quickly,
prevent and alleviate the suffering of people exposed to and those infected
with the virus, as well as those that could potentially be infected or impacted
by COVID-19, and to prevent or minimize the loss of life; . . . .
BE IT PROCLAIMED BY THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
HOUSTON, TEXAS:
...
Section 7. Compliance with Local Health Authority Orders.
Any individual, group of individuals, or property subject to a Local Health
Authority Order restricting the movement of that individual or group of
individuals or restricting movement to, from, or within that property, shall
limit ingress and egress and take such measures as specified by that Local
Health Authority Order.58

Mayor Turner’s Order (the Order) was issued pursuant to Texas
Government Code Section 418.108, which is entitled the Texas Disaster Act
(the Act). Enacted in 1987, the Act was created to allow state and local
officials to “reduce vulnerability of people and communities of [Texas] to
damage, injury, and loss of life and property resulting from natural or manmade catastrophes, riots, or hostile military or paramilitary action.”59 Once
a local state of disaster is declared, the Act enables local officials to perform
various otherwise impermissible actions.60 The relevant one in this instance
being the power to “control ingress to and egress from a disaster area under
58. Jasper Scherer (@jasperscherer), Proclamation Declaring a Local State of Disaster Due to a Public
Health Emergency, TWITTER (Apr. 21, 2020, 2:33 PM) https://twitter.com/jaspscherer/status/
1237855751483166721 [https://perma.cc/Y58Q-A2HL]. Even though Texas Government Code
Section 418.108(c) requires this proclamation be published publicly before it can take effect, I was not
able to find a published copy of this order with the City Secretary’s office. Accordingly, I was forced
to use an electronic copy of the Mayor’s proclamation posted on Jasper Scherer’s twitter account, a
Houston Chronicle reporter.
59. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.002(1).
60. Id. at § 418.108 (providing a list of statutory powers granted to a mayor once a local state of
disaster is declared).
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the jurisdiction and authority of the county judge or mayor and control the
movement of persons and the occupancy of premises in that area.”61 It was
under this authority that the Mayor “ordered the Houston Livestock Show
and Rodeo™ to close.”62 The apparent justification being ingress and
egress from the Rodeo grounds needed restriction for “the safety and wellbeing of [the Rodeo’s] guests and [the Houston] community.”63
The taking of the Rodeo’s property pursuant to the Mayor’s use of the
Act is important for two reasons. First, it means the Mayor may have acted
lawfully. In inverse condemnation claims, the lawfulness of a government’s
act is important in determining whether a taking occurred.64 A finding that
a governmental entity acted unlawfully in appropriating private property
favors a judgment that a compensable taking has occurred.65 Here, the
Mayor acted according to a lawful legislative authorization.66 Second, the
Mayor acted contrary to the Rodeo’s will. Perhaps it goes without saying,
but a government cannot take property previously given willingly.67 Like
other Fifth Amendment rights, consent can waive the right to just
compensation.68 Accordingly, it is important to note the City Order forced

61. Id. at § 418.108(g).
62. See Houston Rodeo Canceled After Local COVID-19 Cases, FOX 26 HOUSTON (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.fox26houston.com/news/houston-rodeo-canceled-after-local-covid-19-cases [https://
perma.cc/WB92-UAM7] (notwithstanding the Rodeo’s desire to continue operating, it “respectfully
and dutifully compl[ied] with the City’s order”).
63. Id.
64. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (emphasis added) (“It seems
to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time
to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police
power . . . .”).
65. See Adams v. City of Weslaco, No. 13-06-00697-CV, 2009 WL 1089442, at *15 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 23, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding an inverse condemnation occurred,
in part, because the governmental entity did not act pursuant to a “legitimate exercise of . . . power”).
66. In researching this Article, I attempted to procure a copy of the Order from the City
Secretary’s office. The Mayor was required to file a copy of the Order under the Act. See GOV’T
§ 418.108(c) (“An order or proclamation declaring, continuing, or terminating a local state of disaster
shall be given prompt and general publicity and shall be filed promptly with the city secretary . . . .”).
I still have not been able to procure a copy of the Order from the City’s Secretary, so it may be possible
the Mayor did not carry out the statutory requirements to declaring a local state of disaster. However,
I have not confirmed this as of the publication of this paper.
67. See Eminent Domain, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (stating a taking must
be done “without the owner’s consent,” otherwise, it is just a consensual transfer of property).
68. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971) (noting the general proposition
that one can waive aspects of their Fifth Amendment rights by consent).
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the Rodeo to close against its will.69 In eminent domain litigation, this
distinction makes a significant difference.70
Although the City’s taking did not affect an actual physical invasion of
the Rodeo’s property, the Mayor’s Order severely disrupted the Rodeo’s
ordinary economic expectations for the use of its property.71 Like most
shows and festivals, the Rodeo has a small window to become profitable.72
Unfortunately for the Rodeo, the Mayor’s Order took effect during that
period of time.73 When the Mayor issued the Order, the Rodeo was nine
days in to its twenty-day program. After which, the Rodeo was prevented
from carrying out any of its contractually permitted uses—canceling the
remainder of the Rodeo programming.74 For example, the Rodeo was
prohibited from selling retail and concessions and exhibiting livestock.75
The Rodeo was also prevented from presenting or broadcasting its musical
acts. Because of the Order’s timing, this meant the Rodeo was deprived of
operating for more than half of its economic usefulness—the effect of
which cannot be overstated.76 If prior economic projections were to hold
true, this disruption likely caused an estimated economic loss of
$113,500,000.77

69. See Attendance, supra note 5 (“[T]he City of Houston and the Houston Health Department
ordered the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo[] to close Wednesday, March 11, 2020.”).
70. See Econ. Dev. & Indus. Corp. of Bos. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 590, 597 (1987) (“Use by
consent cannot constitute a taking.”); see also Patel v. City of Everman, 179 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2004, pet. denied) (noting consent as an affirmative defense to a takings claim, which the
government entity must prove); City of Dallas v. Beeman, 45 S.W. 626, 627 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1898,
writ dism’d) (finding if a petitioner in inverse condemnation consented to governmental invasion of
property, “he cannot recover damages under [Article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution]”).
71. See 2019 Economic Impact, supra note 6 (“The Rodeo generated nearly $400 million in [2019]
economic activity based upon direct spending of $243 million.”).
72. Kelsey Clark, The Economics of Music Festivals, HUFF POST (Apr. 13, 2015, 4:22 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-economics-of-music-festivals_b_7056508?ncid=engmodushp
mg00000006 [https://perma.cc/P9Y3-ZFFG].
73. See Attendance, supra note 5.
74. See The Lease, supra note 48, at 19 (listing the rights granted to the Rodeo under the Lease).
75. Id. at 20.
76. See Attendance, supra note 5 (noting 2,506,263 people attended the Rodeo in 2019 compared
to the 851,822 people who attended in 2020).
77. David Gonzalez, Coronavirus’ Economic Impact on Houston Greater than Just Rodeo Staff, KHOU
11 (Mar. 11, 2020, 10:30 PM), https://www.khou.com/article/entertainment/events/rodeohouston/
coronavirus-economic-impact-on-houston-greater-than-just-rodeo-staff/285-d17533de-a4c1-438e-a6
2c-735d77fbccce [https://perma.cc/XC2N-J3QH] (dividing the economic impact of $227 million in
2019 by two to estimate the 2020 economic impact).
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III. THE LAW
While the City’s interference with the Rodeo’s use and enjoyment of its
property was unquestionably severe, that alone is not enough to ensure the
Rodeo is compensated for the property that has been taken from it.78
Indeed, eminent domain caselaw is filled with examples of serious, yet
uncompensated, attempts to sue for inverse condemnation.79 Considering
this backdrop, understanding the current state of the law surrounding
inverse condemnation claims is crucially important to evaluating the
strength of the Rodeo’s case against the City.80 Conveniently, this can be
done for federal and Texas law easily. As the Texas Supreme Court has
explained, the “[caselaw] on takings under the Texas Constitution is
consistent with federal jurisprudence.”81 Therefore, the Rodeo’s cases
under Texas and federal law can be considered “together, as the analysis for
both [are] complementary.”82 Accordingly, this Article will discuss federal
and state law surrounding inverse condemnation and identify where, if at all,
discrepancies exist.
For those new to eminent domain, it is important to note at the outset
that in contrast to other contexts where an individual sues a governmental
entity,83 grand fights over a governmental entity’s sovereign immunity from
suit are rare in the inverse condemnation setting. That is because both the
Texas and Federal “[C]onstitution[s] waive[] immunity for suits brought
under the Takings Clause . . . .”84 However, such waivers are “predicated
78. See id. (describing the coronavirus’s economic impact on individuals).
79. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–31 (2001) (denying an inverse
condemnation claim where a Rhode Island regulation reduced a property’s value by 94%); see also
Electro Sales & Servs., Inc. v. City of Terrell Hills, No. 04-17-00077-CV, 2018 WL 1309709, at *5 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Mar. 14, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (denying an inverse condemnation claim
because property owners still received some income from renting out a property, even though their
applications for rezoning were denied); Lech v. Jackson, 791 F. App’x 711, 719 (10th Cir. 2019)
(denying an inverse condemnation claim where a SWAT team totally destroyed a house).
80. For a full discussion of the complex history of property ownership, which underlies the
existing legal framework surrounding inverse condemnation claims, interested readers should refer to
Professor Stuart Banner’s seminal book, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND
WHAT WE OWN (2011).
81. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. 2012) (citing City of
Austin v. Travis Cnty. Landfill Co., 73 S.W.3d 234, 238–39 (Tex. 2002)).
82. Id. at 477 (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933–38 (Tex. 1998)).
83. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Tex. 2003) (providing an
example of a sovereign immunity fight under Texas law); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)
(showing an example of a sovereign immunity fight under federal law).
84. City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tex. 2011); see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott,
139 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2019) (“We conclude that a government violates the Takings Clause when it
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upon a viable allegation of taking.”85 “In the absence of a properly pled
takings claim . . . ,” a condemning entity “retains immunity” from suit.86
“Under such circumstances,” a Texas court will sustain “a properly raised
plea to the jurisdiction,” or the federal equivalent, a motion to dismiss.87
Thus, a properly pled claim is key to surviving turbulence at the motion-todismiss stage.
At its core, “a regulatory taking occurs when the government has
unreasonably interfered with a claimant’s use and enjoyment of its
property.”88 Therefore, a regulatory taking claim is considered properly
pled when it alleges that: (1) a government has acted intentionally,
(2) resulting in the uncompensated taking of private property, (3) for a
public use.89 Although the debate over what is, and what is not, a taking is
a question of law that courts are charged with deciding each case,90 the term
“taking” is generally defined as “the acquisition, damage, or destruction of
property via physical or regulatory means,” by a governmental entity.91 The
range of compensable “property” interests that can be taken are defined by
each state’s property laws.92 Since a regulatory taking is a type of an inverse

takes property without compensation, and that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim
under § 1983 at that time.”).
85. City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014) (citing Hearts Bluff Game Ranch,
Inc., 381 S.W.3d at 476).
86. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, 381 S.W.3d at 476.
87. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d at 830; cf. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (outlining the elements necessary to state a takings claim in a case where failure to properly plead
an inverse condemnation claim properly served as the grounds for dismissal).
88. City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Tex. 2013).
89. See State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Tex. 1941) (asking whether a government’s acts were
intentional in the taking of a property); see also Baird v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 324, 329 (1984)
(“Plaintiffs must also prove an ‘intent on the part of the defendant to take plaintiff’s property or an
intention to do an act the natural consequence of which was to take its property’” to win on their
inverse condemnation claim); Barto Watson, Inc. v. City of Houston, 998 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (“To recover on an inverse condemnation claim, a
property owner must establish that (1) the State or other governmental entity intentionally performed
certain acts (2) that resulted in the taking, damaging, or destruction of the owner’s property (3) for
public use.”).
90. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (“Although no precise rule determines when property has been taken . . . the
question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.”).
91. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d at 831.
92. As previously discussed, the Texas Supreme Court has already held a leasehold is a
compensable property interest. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their
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condemnation claim, the two terms are often used interchangeably in cases
alleging inverse condemnation under a regulatory takings theory.93
Importantly for the Rodeo’s case, no categorical exception to the Texas or
Federal Constitutions’ Just Compensation Clause exists when the
government takes property while acting pursuant to its police power.94
Once past the pleading stage, it is up to a court to decide whether a taking
has occurred as a matter of law.95 In doing this, “courts generally eschew
any ‘set formula’ in determining how far is too far when performing a
regulatory takings analysis, preferring [instead] to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries.’”96 This is because “whether a particular property
restriction is a taking depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in
that] case.’”97 To aid courts in this process however, the United States

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law . . . .”).
93. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 739 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (using the terms “inverse condemnation” and “regulatory taking”
interchangeably); see also City of Houston v. Commons at Lake Hous., Ltd., 587 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (explaining a regulatory taking is a type of inverse
condemnation, which does not involve physical invasion).
94. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328 (2002)
(explaining that in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987), the Supreme Court endorsed the following rule laid out by Justice Brennan in his dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981), which allows an award of just
compensation for takings made pursuant to a government’s police powers: “The constitutional rule I
propose requires that, once a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a ‘taking,’ the
government entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation
first effected the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise
amend the regulation.”); see also Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 669–70
(Tex. 2004) (“[T]he takings provisions of the state and federal constitutions do not limit the
government’s power to take private property for public use but instead require that a taking be
compensated. Physical possession is, categorically, a taking for which compensation is constitutionally
mandated, but a restriction in the permissible uses of property or a diminution in its value, resulting
from regulatory action within the government’s police power, may or may not be a compensable taking.
As we have said, ‘all property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power’ and thus not
every regulation is a compensable taking, although some are.” (footnotes omitted)).
95. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (treating the question of whether a taking has occurred as a
question of law); see also Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998) (treating the
question of whether a taking has occurred as a question of law).
96. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. 2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
97. Id. (alteration in original); see also United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
168 (1958) (“Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a particular governmental restriction
amounted to a constitutional taking as being a question properly turning upon the particular
circumstances of each case.”).
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Supreme Court has provided guiding factors to help determine whether a
regulatory taking has occurred.98 The first is reviewing “the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant.”99 Second, one must analyze “the
character of the governmental action.”100 The third factor is reviewing
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the economic
expectations of the property owner.”101 Of equal importance—but not
necessarily a factor of its own—is the “the duration of the [governmental]
restriction” in relation to the bundle of property rights allegedly taken.102
The Texas Supreme Court has approved each of these considerations as
tests for whether an inverse condemnation claim exists and has referred to,
this list of considerations, in short, as the “Penn Central factors . . . .”103
Hardly trivial, a condemning authority “must . . . conclusively disprove[]”
all the Penn Central factors in its favor in order to win at summary
judgment.104 If it does not, a regulatory takings case will go to trial. A high
burden for condemning authorities, this requires trial settings where factual
disputes still exist as to either “(1) the economic impact on the claimant;
(2) the extent of interference with the claimant’s investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the government’s action.”105
Considering that, in the summary judgment context, courts are required to
review the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging
every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion,”106

98. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, 381 S.W.3d at 477 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
99. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
100. Id. at 477–78 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
101. Id. at 478 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
102. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327, 342
(2002).
103. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“The Penn Central factors—
though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for
resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.” (citing
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–618(2001))); see also City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings,
L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Tex. 2013) (“The United States Supreme Court has identified three key
factors to guide our analysis: (1) the economic impact on the claimant; (2) the extent of interference
with the claimant’s investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government’s action.”
(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124)).
104. BMTP Holdings, 409 S.W.3d at 644 (demonstrating a Texas court’s use of the federal test
for whether an inverse condemnation has occurred).
105. Id. at 644–45 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
106. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005).
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this evidentiary burden heavily favors the party asserting inverse
condemnation.107
In City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P.,108 for example, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed an appellate court’s affirmance of a trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of a city alleged to have inversely
condemned property because the city failed to “conclusively disprove[]” one
of the factors for inverse condemnation.109 Specifically, the Texas Supreme
Court held “the City . . . failed to meet its burden of establishing” the
second factor, “that no issues of material fact exist[ed] with respect to [the
City’s] interference with [the claimant’s] use and enjoyment of its
property . . . .”110 Using a previously decided Texas Supreme Court case,
Sheffield Development Co. v. City of Glenn Heights,111 as its lodestar, the court
explained it is the alleged condemning authority’s responsibility to show that
no issue of material fact exists as to (1) “the economic impact on the
[aggrieved property] owner;” (2) “the . . . frustration of the [aggrieved
property] owner’s investment-backed expectations;” and (3) the character
of the government intrusion.112 Failure to show one of these elements
means the condemning authority has failed to meet its burden at summary
judgment.113
IV. THE CASE
Application of the Penn Central factors to the Rodeo’s regulatory takings
case confirms that a compensable taking has occurred.114
To begin, the economic impact of the City’s Order on the Rodeo was
quite severe.115 Like most festivals, the Rodeo only had a handful of days

107. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1137 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e must
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Bucklew and draw every justifiable inference in his
favor.” (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam))).
108. City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2013).
109. Id. at 644–45.
110. Id. at 646.
111. Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2012).
112. BMTP Holdings, 409 S.W.3d at 645; see also Sheffield Dev. Co., 140 S.W.3d at 671 (holding a
denial of an inverse condemnation claim).
113. Sheffield Dev. Co., 140 S.W.3d at 671–72.
114. See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 477 (quoting Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)) (discussing how courts apply the Penn Central factors to
alleged regulatory takings).
115. Id. at 477 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))
(describing the first factor to be analyzed in a regulatory taking case).
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in which it could operate in the hopes of turning a profit.116 This roadmap
to profitability was inherently dependent on the Rodeo’s ability to amass
large crowds at its site; meaning, from the outset, the Rodeo was more
vulnerable than other businesses to experience serious consequences from
the government shutdown Order.117 In fact, it was because of this very
characteristic that the Rodeo was singled out as a candidate for shutdown
by the City in the first place.118 However, the manner and speed in which
the Order went into effect also played a part in the severity of the Order’s
economic impact on the Rodeo. Having the Order go into full effect
immediately, the City caused a stark shear in the Rodeo’s earnings capacity
from one day to the next.119 Hardly trivial, the Rodeo’s program generated
an economic impact of $227 million dollars in 2019.120 On par with
popular festivals like Lollapalooza,121 Coachella,122 and Austin City
Limits,123 this meant the Order likely caused the Rodeo an economic
disruption around $113.5 million.124 The economic impact was only

116. Jake Mann, The 3 Keys to Profitable Music Festivals, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 18, 2014, 9:35
AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/18/the-3-keys-to-profitable-music-festivals
.aspx [https://perma.cc/TA3Z-3JTL] (explaining the short amount of time, usually a handful days, in
which a festival has to become profitable).
117. See Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2003) (showing it is irrelevant the Rodeo
may have been uncharacteristically vulnerable to a shutdown because “a defendant takes a plaintiff as
he finds her”).
118. It stands to reason that if large crowds did not amass at the Rodeo, then the City would
not have targeted it for shutdown.
119. See Holley, supra note 12 (discussing previous rodeo attendance, operating expenses, and
employment opportunities).
120. Gonzalez, supra note 77.
121. Greg Kot, Slow Lollapalooza Ticket Sales Reflect Competition, Price and Security Concerns, CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/ct-entlollapalooza-tickets-analysis-20180323-story.html [https://perma.cc/AKD7-MYVL] (estimating
Lollapalooza’s economic impact at $245 million during one festival weekend).
122. Desert Sun Staff, Coachella, Stagecoach Music Festivals Move to October amid Coronavirus Concerns,
USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2020, 8:54 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/music/
2020/03/10/coachella-stagecoach-music-festivals-postponed-coronavirus/5016224002/ [https://per
ma.cc/HKK6-T4M7] (estimating Coachella’s economic impact at $400 million).
123. Daniel Salazar, Austin City Limits Musical Festival’s Economic Impact Grows to Nearly $265M,
AUSTIN BUS. J. (Apr. 30, 2019, 10:50 AM) https://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2019/04/
29/austin-city-limits-musical-festivals-economic.html [https://perma.cc/7WN8-AUXD] (estimating
Austin City Limits’ economic impact at $265 million).
124. See Gonzalez, supra note 77 (dividing the previous economic impact of $227 million by two
to produce an estimated economic disruption for 2020).
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exaggerated for the Rodeo because of its compressed timeline for
profitability.125
The extent of the City’s interference with the Rodeo’s investment-backed
expectations was equally severe.126 Fully understanding the degree of this
interference requires an understanding of the property rights the Rodeo
owned at the time it was forced to shut down. The Rodeo did not own a
fee simple in NRG Park.127 Rather, the Rodeo owned a leasehold interest
in NRG Park, which it received from the Harris County Sports &
Convention Corporation.128 As with many leaseholds, the Rodeo’s Lease
endowed it with less than the full range of rights, which the lessor could
have transferred as the fee simple owner of NRG Park.129 This meant the
denominator of property rights the Rodeo owned in NRG Park, from which
its investment-backed expectations could flower, was smaller than the
denominator owned by the lessor before executing the leasehold.130
Importantly, the Rodeo bargained for this lesser array of rights because they
were the only rights the Rodeo needed to operate a rodeo and livestock
exhibition.131 Nothing more nor less. When the City’s Order extinguished
each of these rights, it extinguished the means through which the Rodeo
could achieve its only investment-backed expectation—to put on a
rodeo.132 Of what use is a lease for facilities to put on a rodeo when a
lessee is forbidden from doing just that?

125. Kot, supra note 121 (estimating Lollapalooza’s economic impact at $245 million during one
festival weekend).
126. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. 2012) (citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (describing the third factor analyzed
in a regulatory takings case).
127. See The Lease, supra note 48, at 1 (recognizing Harris County Sports & Convention
Corporation as the landlord and Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo, Inc. as the tenant).
128. Id. at 19.
129. See id. at 19–21 (presenting the list of uses for which the Rodeo may use NRG Park and
the list of prohibited uses retained by the Harris County Sports & Convention Corporation).
130. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)
(presenting an introduction to and brief explanation of the denominator concept of property rights
analysis).
131. See The Lease, supra note 48, at 19–20 (showing the list of uses for which the Rodeo could
use NRG Park).
132. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 348–49 (stating leaseholds, if taken, are
compensable interests in property); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378
(1945) (“Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are
so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a
taking.”).
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Lastly, there are open questions about the character of the Order, which
suggests the City may have acted illegally in shutting down the Rodeo.
Specifically, a recent Texas Supreme Court decision questioned whether the
Order was reasonably tailored to the seriousness of the coronavirus
threat.133 Such a finding of disproportionality would heavily favor a
judgment that a compensable taking occurred.134 As the Texas Supreme
Court reminded us: “The Constitution is not suspended when the
government declares a state of disaster.”135 In the coming months, the
government will “be expected to demonstrate that less restrictive measures
[could not have] adequately address[ed] the [coronavirus] threat.”136 If the
government fails in their demonstration, municipal shutdown orders, like
the one here, will be held unconstitutional by state and federal courts.
Confusion and misinformation manifested “[w]hen the present crisis
began [because] perhaps not enough was known about the virus to secondguess the worst-case projections motivating the lockdowns.”137 “As more
becomes known about the threat and about the less restrictive, more
targeted ways to respond to it,” governmental restrictions on business
operations “may not survive judicial scrutiny.”138 While this review has not
yet taken place, the Texas Supreme Court sternly pointed out it would “not
shrink from its duty to require the government’s anti-virus orders to comply
with the Constitution and the law . . . .”139 Included is the government’s

133. See Taylor Goldenstein, Texas Supreme Court Says Coronavirus Restrictions on Business ‘May Not
Survive Judicial Scrutiny’, HOUS. CHRON. (May 5, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.houston
chronicle.com/politics/texas/article/Texas-high-court-says-Abbott-s-restrictions-on-15248326.php
[https://perma.cc/F7JE-AZPR] (discussing Justice Blacklock’s opinion stating that “during a public
health emergency, the onus is on the government to explain why its measures are necessary and why
other less restrictive measures would not adequately address the threat”).
134. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (emphasis added) (“It seems
to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time
to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police
powers . . . .”); see Adams v. City of Weslaco, No. 13-06-00697-CV, 2009 WL 1089442, at *15 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 23, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding an inverse condemnation occurred,
in part, because the governmental entity did not act pursuant to a “legitimate exercise of . . . power”).
135. In re Salon a la Mode, No. 20-0340, 2020 WL 2125844, at *1 (Tex. May 5, 2020) (orig.
proceeding) (Blacklock, J., concurring) (quoting In re Abbott, No. 20-0291, 2020 WL 1943226, at *1
(Tex. 2020)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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duty to pay just compensation.140 Considering this coming judicial scrutiny,
the City may have acted illegally in shutting down the Rodeo.141
A review of federal and Texas takings cases, similar to the one here, also
confirms the City’s taking of the Rodeo’s property.
In City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P.,142 for example, the Texas
Supreme Court decided whether a City’s moratorium on development
affected a compensable taking.143 Like the case here, the moratorium
temporarily suspended the monetization of a landowner’s property rights,
preventing a landowner from achieving their only investment-backed
expectation for purchasing a property—to “sell . . . lots.”144 There, the
Texas Supreme Court ultimately sided with the landowner by reversing the
trial court’s finding that the moratorium on development was not a
regulatory taking.145 In making its decision, the Texas Supreme Court
highlighted the fact that there was evidence that each of the Penn Central
factors had been satisfied.146 Specifically, there was evidence of a severe
economic disruption because the property at issue fell in value “83% due to
the moratorium based on a comparison of the value of lots sold before the
moratorium took effect to the tax appraisal value while the moratorium was
in place.”147 There was evidence of serious interference with investmentbacked expectations because the plaintiff-developer was “unable to sell the
140. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002)
(discussing compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution); see also In re Salon a la
Mode, 2020 WL 2125844, at *1 (noting a government must answer to suspending the people’s liberties
during the pandemic).
141. There is an additional ground a court could find the Order invalid. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 418.108(c) (“An order or proclamation declaring, continuing, or terminating a local state of
disaster shall be given prompt and general publicity and shall be filed promptly with the city
secretary . . . .”). I remained unable to procure a copy of the Order from the City’s Secretary—it is
possible the Mayor failed to carry out the statutory requirements to declaring a local state of disaster.
However, I have not confirmed this as of the publication of this Article.
142. City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2013).
143. Id. at 637.
144. See id. at 645–46 (discussing the frustration of property owner’s investment-backed
expectations of selling lots because of the moratorium).
145. See id. at 637 (finding, for the property owner’s declaratory judgment claim, the moratorium
cannot apply against its approved development for a subdivision and remanding the inverse
condemnation claim for further resolution of factual disputes before judicially addressing the merits of
the takings claim).
146. See id. at 645–46 (discussing evidence BMTP presented to show (1) evidence of its
economic impact, (2) evidence of its frustration of investment–backed expectations, and (3) facts
showing the moratorium’s intrusion is still disputed).
147. See id. at 645.
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lots as a result of the moratorium.”148 And finally, there was evidence
disputing the legality of the local municipality “enforc[ing]” the moratorium
against the plaintiff.149
Likewise, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,150 the Supreme Court decided whether a moratorium on
development affected a compensable taking.151 There, the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency instituted a thirty-two-month ban on development in
certain areas in and around Lake Tahoe.152 Unlike in the Rodeo’s case,
however, the plaintiff there asserted “a moratorium on development . . .
constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.”153 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court evaluated the plaintiff’s case under the Penn Central factors.
In denying evaluation of the plaintiff’s claim under the Lucas per se takings
rule, however, the Supreme Court expounded on the contours of existing
regulatory takings law under Penn Central.154
Regulatory takings analysis, the Supreme Court wrote, “entails complex
factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government
actions,” the results of which will determine whether a taking has been
effectuated.155 An example of such an assessment is understanding the
“character of the action” alleged to constitute a taking and how that action
relates to the alleged “interference with rights in the [taken] parcel as a
whole.”156 Understanding this relationship explains why “a regulation that
prohibited commercial transactions in eagle feathers, but did not bar other
uses or impose any physical invasion or restraint upon them, was not a
taking.”157 In contrast, a regulation prohibiting the mining of anthracite
coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of the surface is a regulatory

148. Id. at 646.
149. See id. (explaining how the municipality could not enforce the moratorium against BMTP
as it had already approved the subdivision of property before the moratorium’s enactment).
150. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
151. See id. at 306 (discussing the issue before the Court of whether a moratorium on
development constitutes a per se taking).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id at 321 (declining to apply a per se takings rule under Lucas for temporary moratoria).
155. See id. at 323 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)). “[W]e do not apply
our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory takings claims.” Id. at 323–24.
156. Id. at 327 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131
(1978)).
157. Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
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taking.158 The difference between the two is the taking of some of a
landowner’s property rights as opposed to all. “[W]here an owner possesses
a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the
bundle is not a taking.”159
Here, review of the “character of the [City’s] action . . . [and] the nature
and extent of the interference” it caused the Rodeo’s rights to its leasehold
“as a whole” strongly suggests the Rodeo’s property was taken.160 Unlike
“set-back ordinance[s]”161 or “a government regulation that merely
prohibits landlords from evicting tenants unwilling to pay a higher rent,”162
the Rodeo’s deprivation of property rights was complete and severe. After
implementation of the Order, the Rodeo could no longer achieve its only
investment-backed expectation and the purpose of its lease. Moreover, like
in BMTP, there is evidence the Rodeo’s case satisfies each of the Penn Central
factors for regulatory takings. The Rodeo experienced millions of dollars in
economic disruption.163 The forced closure prevented the Rodeo from
achieving its only investment-backed expectation,164 and there are open
questions as to the character of the City’s action.165 Furthermore, unlike a
moratorium, which applies to all property owners equally, the Rodeo was
“‘singled out’ to bear a special burden” in shutting down not “shared by the
public as a whole.”166 In fact, during and after the Rodeo’s ban many
158. Id. at 325–26 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
159. Id. at 327 (citing Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65–66).
160. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31).
161. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 605 (1927) (discussing the constitutionality of an
ordinance establishing setback lines and how it did not deprive property owner of any right under the
U.S. Constitution).
162. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322–23 (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)).
163. See 2019 Economic Impact, supra note 6 (providing the Rodeo’s economic impact in 2019
totaled $227 million); and Attendance, supra note 5 (highlighting 2020 attendance decrease from 2019
attendance because “the City of Houston and the Houston Health Department ordered the [Rodeo]
to close”); see also Gonzalez, supra note 77 (presenting evidence on the widespread economic impact of
the Rodeo’s closure).
164. See The Lease, supra note 48, at 19–20 (showing the list of permitted uses for which the
Rodeo could use NRG Park).
165. See In re Salon a la Mode, No. 20-0340, 2020 WL 2125844, at *1 (Tex. May 5, 2020) (orig.
proceeding) (Blacklock, J., concurring) (“Government power cannot be exercised in conflict with these
constitutions, even in a pandemic.”); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.108(c) (“An order or
proclamation declaring, continuing, or terminating a local state of disaster shall be given prompt and
general publicity and shall be filed promptly with the city secretary . . . .”).
166. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 340–41 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987)) (drawing a distinction between the moratorium at issue in this case as
opposed to the singular burden the Rodeo solely carried).
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businesses were deemed essential and allowed to continue operating.167
The Rodeo was not so lucky.
V. CONCLUSION
The “question at bottom” of any inverse condemnation case “is upon
whom the loss of the [government’s actions] should fall[?]”168 Here, the
answer is simple. But for the City’s possibly illegal actions, the Rodeo would
have happily operated for its 88th consecutive year. Because the Rodeo was
not allowed to do that, jobs were lost,169 children’s scholarship funds were
withheld,170 and countless individuals were pushed into debt.171 This is
not a burden the Rodeo should have to bear alone, regardless of the fact the
City acted pursuant to its police powers. Indeed, this is why the founding
fathers initially conceived the Takings Clause, so that a mechanism existed
to spread the cost of public initiatives across the community and to prevent
“the public from loading upon one individual more than his [or her] just
share of the burdens of government[.]”172 By doing this, we ensure “‘the
security of Property,’ which Alexander Hamilton described to the
Philadelphia Convention as one of the ‘great ob[jects] of
Gov[ernment].’”173
To those fearing the potential consequences that may ensue if the Rodeo
is compensated for the City’s use of its police powers, look at the fallout
from the “revolutionary” condemnation cases from the past. All too often,
“[a]fter each successive Supreme Court decision on property rights, we have
imagined a parade of horribles that ultimately never appeared.”174 After
167. See Ross Ramsey, Analysis: What Makes a Business Essential Depends on Where You Sit, TEX.
TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/06/what-makes-businessessential-depends-where-you-sit/ [https://perma.cc/3JXA-7E8R] (providing a good discussion of the
relativity of the designation as a non-essential business: “every business is essential to someone”).
168. Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
169. See Past Entertainers, supra note 8 (indexing past performers and entertainers the Rodeo has
once employed as well as the associated employment with such entertainers).
170. Elliot, supra note 40 (describing how the cancellation of the Rodeo impacted junior
exhibitors’ ability to compete for educational funds).
171. See KTRK Houston, supra note 10 (revealing reactions to the Rodeo’s cancellation).
172. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
173. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original) (citing 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302
(M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
174. Dwight Merriam, Rose Mary Knick and the Story of Chicken Little, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639,
641 (2020).
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First English,175 Lucas,176 and Kelo,177 professional and lay commentators
alike hurried to predict “doom and gloom.”178 Yet, catastrophe never
came. That is because such hysteria is often overblown, and the
consequences of prior court decisions regarding property rights “have
proved mostly unremarkable.”179 If the Rodeo is compensated here, “the
end of the story is likely to be happy enough: the sky will not fall, and all can
be saved.”180
In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, we have seen several more
cases like the Rodeo’s, and interested parties expect many more to come.181
A finding in the Rodeo’s favor here would make it clear there is no
categorical exception to the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause
when the government takes property while acting pursuant to its police
power. While the Rodeo may not be the most vulnerable of us, it is a standin for the position we could be in. And if the preservation of property rights
is truly “one of the most important purposes of government[,]”182 justice
and fairness demands that the Rodeo receive just compensation. We are all
just one government action away from being the victims of a government
taking. Why not encourage an understanding of the law surrounding
eminent domain that protects “those owners who, for whatever reasons,
may be unable to protect themselves in the political process against the
majority’s will[?]”183 As Justice Holmes put it nearly 100 years ago, failing
175. First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
176. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
177. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
178. See Merriam, supra note 174, at 641–43 (describing the public reaction to decisions of
inverse condemnation cases).
179. See id. at 641 (positing the reactions to resulting consequences of key cases relating to
inverse condemnation are not justified); see also Emilio Longoria, Invisible, but Not Transparent:
An Analysis of the Data Privacy Issues that Could Be Implicated by the Widespread Use of Connected Vehicles,
28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 38 (2017) (“[W]e have been cocksure of many things that were not so.”).
180. Merriam, supra note 174, at 641.
181. See In re Salon a la Mode, No. 20-0340, 2020 WL 2125844, at *1 (Tex. May 5, 2020) (orig.
proceeding) (Blacklock, J., concurring) (positing in the coming months, local governments will be
expected to “demonstrate—both to its citizens and to the courts—that its chosen measures are
absolutely necessary to combat a threat of overwhelming severity”); see also Jorge A. Vela, Crowd Gathers
at Laredo City Hall to Support Arrested Beauticians, Protest Coronavirus Mandates, LAREDO MORNING TIMES
(May 13, 2020), https://www.lmtonline.com/local/article/Dallas-salon-owner-Laredo-s-2-homebeauticians-15267545.php [https://perma.cc/7Y5F-ESDF] (providing an example of possible
regulatory takings cases similar to the Rodeo’s to come).
182. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
183. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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to do so puts us “in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”184

184. Pa. Coal. Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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